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I. INTRODUCTION
OURTS analyzing "advertising injury" coverage for patent in-
fringement lawsuits have been faced with a fundamental di-
lemma-the questions asked by the policy language are rarely
answered, one way or the other, on the face of the pleadings, or in docu-
ments typically filed in connection with such lawsuits prior to the deter-
mination of damages. These questions include:
(1) whether the elements to establish liability under the asserted intel-
lectual property claim bear a causal nexus to the insured's advertis-
ing activities;
(2) whether the liability theory depends upon facts which fall within
the meaning of one or more enumerated "advertising injury" of-
fenses, such as "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business" or "infringement of copyright, title or slogan"; and
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(3) whether damages are sought in the lawsuit such that the injury suf-
fered will be connected with liability that constitutes an enumer-
ated "advertising injury" offense.
A number of courts have wrestled with these issues in analyzing cover-
age for different claims of patent infringement lawsuits this year. Cases
holding that "patent infringement" itself is not a covered "advertising in-
jury" offense misdirect the appropriate focus of coverage analysis since it
is the facts that support a cause of action, not the label asserted in con-
nection therewith, that determine potential coverage. There are, moreo-
ver, many varieties of patent infringement claims, some of which involve
advertising as an element of both liability and damages, some of which do
not.
This article will focus on the most promising offenses in standard form
Commercial General Liability Policies issued by ISO:' piracy/unfair com-
petition (1976 ISO) and the successor offense of "misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business" (1986 ISO). It will address
whether advertising-based "offer for sale" patent infringement claims
may trigger liability under any of these "advertising injury" offenses, and
if so, how this may trigger a policyholder's right to a defense in such
lawsuits.
II. OVERVIEW OF COVERAGE CASE LAW ADDRESSING
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS IN 1999
A. SUMMARY OF CASE LAW
Courts are divided on whether the offense of "infringement of title"
may include "interference with ownership rights" as a form of "title" in-
fringement. To date, the majority of courts to address this issue have
found that this is not a permissible construction.2 However, courts so
finding do not explain why the rules requiring construction of ambiguous
policy language against the insurer are not implicated by the two variant
definitions for that offense which they admit are viable-"improper use
of another's name or designation on advertisement" or "the name of a
literary or artistic work."'3
The Federal Circuit recently conceded that the predecessor offense of
"piracy" encompassed patent infringement claims.4 ISO, the drafter of
the policy language in question, opined that there was "no change in
scope" between the old and new policy language, thus the "misappropria-
1. The Insurance Services Office ("ISO").
2. Maxconn, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), modi-fied, 74 Cal. App. 4th 126 (1999); U.S. Test, Inc. v. NDE Envtl. Corp., 196 F.3d 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. SST Fitness Corp., 182 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 1999); Mez
Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Nat'l Ins. Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); but see
Homedics, Inc. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., No. SA CV 99-9281999, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17317
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1999), dismissed, No. SA CV 99-928-DOC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8920
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2000).
3. Maxconn, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 1278.
4. U.S. Test, 196 F.3d at 1382.
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tion of advertising ideas" offense replaced "piracy," and "misappropria-
tion of style of doing business" replaced "unfair competition."' 5 If the
latter "misappropriation" offenses are ambiguous and insurer pronounce-
ments about their meaning may properly be considered, there is no rea-
son why these generic, lay offenses cannot be interpreted to extend at
minimum a duty of defense in the appropriate advertising-based "offer
for sale" case.6
B. VIEWS EXPRESSED By COMMENTATORS WHO REPRESENT
INSURERS REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE FOR
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS FAIL TO Focus ON THE NATURE OF
How LIABILITY WILL ENSUE IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION
Insurer coverage attorneys have penned a number of articles on this
topic recently. 7 These articles discuss the recent Mez case, and misstate,
as did the court, the basis for liability therein. Mez was not sued for in-
ducing Mez's customer "to take ... component parts and put them to-
gether in a way which infringed Ductmate's patents."'8 The patent claims
at issue dealt with process patent claims. Liability was asserted for induc-
ing the "use" of that process through advertisements which described the
elements of the patent owner's invention that were the asserted grounds
for liability. Court's conclusions addressing inducements which were
grounded on the notion that patent infringement claims did not constitute
the type of risk intended to be covered by insurance for "advertising in-
jury" liability failed to note that earlier policy provisions which encom-
passed coverage for "piracy" have readily been found to encompass
patent infringement claims.9
Similarly, variant policy provisions such as those issued by Wausau as
analyzed by the court in Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp. v. Employ-
5. Bay Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 611, 617 (S.D.
Tex. 1999).
6. Everett Assocs., Inc. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 874, 880-881 (N.D. Cal.
1999), stay granted by No. C-97-4308 SC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2802 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15,
2001).
7. Susan M. Popik, amicus curiae counsel in Mez, wrote an article for the Los Ange-
les Daily Journal entitled "Passing-Off Advertising Injury Policies Don't Cover Induce-
ment of Patent Infringement." Elizabeth M. Medaglia of Jackson & Campbell authored an
article appearing concurrently herewith entitled "Advertising Injury Coverage: Recent
Case Law Developments Concerning Claims for Insurance Coverage of Patent Infringe-
ment Lawsuits." A recent article appearing in the Torts & Insurance Practice Insurance
Coverage Litigation Committee Newsletter, Winter 2001, by B. Gerald Cordelli of Rob-
bins, Kaplan, Miller & Ceresi, LLP, Washington, D.C., discusses the Everett decision and
opines that in light of subsequent California case law its analysis will not support finding a
duty to defend for claims of "offer for sale" patent infringement that depend on advertising
liability.
8. Mez, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
9. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Tech., 935 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Or. 1996); New
Hampshire Ins. Co. v. R.L. Chaides, 847 F. Supp. 1.452 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Union Ins. Co. v.
Land & Sky, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Neb. 1995), appeal after remand, 568 N.W.2d 908




ers Insurance of Wausau,10 which included patent infringement as an "ad-
vertising injury" offense, certainly evidence that some forms of patent
infringement must bear a nexus to advertising; otherwise, such policies
would be illusory.
While the Maxconn court noted that patent infringement claims were
not an articulated "advertising injury" offense, the same is true of trade-
mark, trade dress, and unfair competition, which have been readily found
to fall within the ambit of the ambiguous lay offenses of "misappropria-
tion of advertising ideas or style of doing business" or "infringement of
title" in appropriate circumstances. Indeed, Maxconn relied on Advance
Watch and its progeny, which was rejected by the same court of appeals
which decided Mez and Lebas. The fact that Lebas thereafter cited cases
following Advance Watch shows the inconsistency of the court's reasoning
on this point. There is nothing about the offense of "misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business" which would limit its ambit
to any narrow common law tort.11
Narrow construction of court opinions analyzing patent infringement
lawsuits is not limited to insurer coverage counsel. Some intellectual
property practitioners have weighed in, accepting poorly reasoned argu-
ments in some coverage cases as the last word regarding potential cover-
age in this area of law.12 An article suggests that the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in United National Insurance Co. v. SST Fitness Corp.:13
(1) has properly read the meaning of "advertising injury" coverage
law in light of applicable rules of policy construction;
(2) is well reasoned and should be heeded by policyholders; and
(3) foreclosed opportunities for coverage under offer-for-sale patent
infringement claims.
Contrary to the article's conclusion, the SST analysis is anomalous in
that it follows authority which has not been found persuasive in virtually
every jurisdiction outside the Sixth Circuit. Virtually every other case to
interpret coverage for the undefined offenses of "infringement of title"
and "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" has
concluded that the phrases are ambiguous as applied to a range of intel-
lectual property torts and should, therefore, be interpreted against the
insurer which drafted the policy and in favor of finding a duty of de-
fense.14 The logic of the court's opinion would preclude coverage under
10. 144 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 1998).
11. Sentex Sys. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 93 F.3d 578, 581 (9th Cir.
1996).
12. A recent February/March 2000 newsletter titled "Ideas on Intellectual Property
Law" from Laff, Whitesel & Saret, Ltd. carried an article entitled, "Read Between the
Lines."
13. 182 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying Ohio law).
14. See Advance Watch Co., Ltd. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795, 802 (6th Cir.
1996), reh'g on banc denied, No. 95-1367/95-1387, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 34340 (6th Cir.
Dec. 30, 1996); Flodine v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 99 C 7466, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2204,
at *23-24 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2001) (The rule that
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" means only
the common-law tort of misappropriation and not trademark or trade dress
2001] 1925
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any form of intellectual property claim, including trademark.
The SST court did not analyze whether "offer for sale" patent infringe-
ment claims may bear a causal nexus to the insured's advertising activities
or whether in that context claims for such infringement might potentially
fall within one or more of the enumerated "advertising injury" offenses.
Indeed, the only court in any published order to address that precise
question found for the insured.15
Patent coverage cases are difficult because they often require careful
analysis of the elements in the underlying case that could establish both
infringement, first articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Advance Watch, is based on the rationale that the policy language at issue
does not specifically list 'trademark' in the advertising injury definition. [Ad-
vance Watch Co., Ltd. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795, 803 (6th Cir.
1996).] ... However, this court agrees with decisions of other courts conclud-
ing that Advance Watch's approach conflicts with the rule of contract inter-
pretation followed by many state courts, including those of Colorado and
Illinois, that the ordinary meaning of policy terms controls ....
Id. at *23-24. Bay Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616-17
(S.D. Tex. 1999).
Numerous courts throughout the country have agreed with Plaintiffs that
coverage for trademark and trade dress infringement claims is provided
under the "advertising injury" offense of "misappropriation of advertising
ideas or style of doing business." ... This court respectfully disagrees with
the Sixth Circuit [in Advance Watch] and concludes, as did the court in Indus-
trial Molding, that the insurance policy at issue [does] not limit [Travelers']
liability to suits arising under the common-law tort of misappropriation "If
the drafters of this insurance policy wanted to limit their exposure to "suits
arising under the common-law tort of misappropriation" ... it would have
been a simple matter to do so. . . . [T]he court agrees with Plaintiffs that
misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business encompasses
claims for trademark and trade dress infringement.
Lebas Fashion Imps. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1996); Nortek, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (D.R.I.
1994) ("stating that the misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business
offense was intended to cover a form of unfair competition where a company attempts to
imitate a competitor's advertising materials"); P.J. Noyes Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co.,
855 F. Supp. 492, 494-95 (D.N.H. 1994) (stating that "the allegations that Noyes used the
name 'Dust Free Precision Pellets' in their advertising, literature and packing, arguably
falls within the ambit of misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business or
infringement of a title or slogan"); Ross v. Briggs & Morgan, 520 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 54 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1995) (asserting that Dr. Ross'
competitive advertising fell within the policy's coverage for the "advertising injury" of-
fenses of "infringement of title" as well as "unauthorized taking of advertising ideas or
style of doing business").
15. See Everett, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 874. (The court emphasized that the duty to defend
finding would stand but concluded that no indemnity was appropriate. The latter decision
was impacted by the court's erroneous belief that, bound as it was to follow definitive
decisions by California courts of appeal, the court in Maxconn had definitively found that
no form of "offer for sale" patent infringement, even if it bore an advertising nexus, could
fall within any construction of the 1986 ISO policy provision. To the contrary, the court, on
rehearing in Maxconn, clarified that its analysis was limited to infringement of title and did
not reach the "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" offense
which lead to settlement of the case on remand. See Maxconn, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 1271.
Absent such a conclusion, there would have been no reason for the court to remand the
case. Moreover, if Maxconn had been determinative, the court in Mez Industries, Inc. v.
Pacific National Ins. Co., 76 Cal. App. 4th 856 (1999) would not have expressed no opinion




causal nexus and evidence of an enumerated "advertising injury" offense.
The simplistic analysis of the SST court, while providing a bright line
which is easy for courts to apply, does not properly interpret the policy
language in light of applicable rules of policy construction. In sum, the
insurer analysis referenced fails to confront the character of patent in-
fringement allegations premised on an "offer for sale" where advertising
is the sole basis for liability and the circumstances which in some in-
stances may permit coverage adjudications in favor of insureds under
such fact scenarios.
C. WHY EVERETT SETS FORTH THE MORE COGENT AND
ANALYTICALLY APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS
Policyholder efforts to procure insurance benefits in patent infringe-
ment lawsuits have been subject to a number of setbacks. Nevertheless,
in Everett,'6 Judge Conti breached the wall of unfavorable case law. In
analyzing an "offer for sale" patent infringement lawsuit, the court found
it significant that the liability in the underlying action would depend
solely upon the insured's advertising activities as they related to the "of-
fer for sale" claim. The court reasoned:
Under the Clark court's express ruling, Everett could have been held
liable at trial for damages for patent infringement solely by virtue of
its having advertised infringing products. In light of this, it is difficult
to say how Transcontinental could prove the absence of any potential
for advertising injury coverage.' 7
Analyzing the pertinent "advertising injury" offense in this context, the
court stated:
Like patent infringement in the case at hand, trademark infringe-
ment was not specifically enumerated as an "advertising injury" in
the language of the Lebas policy. Therefore the Court had to deter-
mine whether the misappropriation clause was ambiguous, and could
reasonably be construed by the insured to cover trademark infringe-
ment absent express use of the term .... This Court agrees with the
Lebas Court that the language of the misappropriation clause is am-
biguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.18
While the court does not translate the elements of the "misappropria-
tion" offense into other, simpler English components and then apply that
newly defined phrase to the claims before it, the court's finding that lia-
bility and damages (for price erosion) were purely advertising-based and
realization that in this context the "misappropriation" offense was ambig-
uous supports finding a defense.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 884 (citing Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1160
(Cal. 1993)).
18. Id. at 880.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE
THREE-PART TEST TO ESTABLISH
"ADVERTISING INJURY" COVERAGE
A. THE DISTINCT CHARACTER OF OFFENSE-BASED "ADVERTISING
INJURY"/"PERSONAL INJURY" INSURANCE COVERAGE
The coverage issues posed by offense-based "advertising injury" and
''personal injury" coverage require a more precise level of analysis than a
simple reference to what a particular court believes should constitute
"advertising injury" or "personal injury." In contrast to coverage for
"property damage" or "bodily injury," "advertising injury" and "personal
injury" coverage is offense, not conduct-based and may include within
their ambit a number of potential torts. 19 The fact that the offenses them-
selves do not track recognized common law or statutory torts in many
instances under either the 1976 ISO, 1986 ISO or 1998 ISO forms has
perplexed many courts.2 0 As a consequence, these courts have failed to
apply the rule that policies must be interpreted as they are understood by
a lay person, not an insurance expert or attorney.2' They have also made
much of the absence of the term "patent infringement" from policy lan-
guage, failing to recognize that such an approach turns on its head stan-
dard rules of policy construction. 22
B. THE THREE-PART TEST
Disagreements between policyholders and insurers as to constructions
of policy language emanate from a fundamental disagreement about ar-
ticulation, as well as construction of the test for establishing potential
coverage. A surprisingly large number of "advertising injury" coverage
19. Speaking directly to this issue, in Tinseltown Video, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 71 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), the court stated:
In the world of liability insurance, personal injury coverage applies to injury
which arises out of the commission of certain enumerated acts or offenses.
[Citations omitted.] Coverage thus is triggered by the offense, not the injury
or damage which a plaintiff suffers. [Citations omitted.]
To the extent the listed offenses [in the policy] are framed in generic terms,
they should be construed broadly to encompass all specific torts which rea-
sonably could fall within the general category.
Id. at 377-78 (citing Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 16 Cal. App. 4th
492 (1993)).
20. Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying
Pennsylvania law and stating that "Advance Watch has been sharply criticized for ignoring
the real contours of intellectual property litigation, which often proceeds under a bewilder-
ing variety of different labels covering the same material facts").
21. McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d
168, 171 (Mo. 1999): ("Noting that the word 'offense' cannot be read to limit coverage
only to a particular 'cause of action' or 'claim.' The word 'offense' simply does not have
this meaning in either common usage or legal usage.")
22. Pardee Constr. Co. v. Ins. Co. of the West, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 457 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) ("If the parties had intended coverage to be limited to the [extent] suggested by the
defendants [the insurers], language clearly embodying that intention was available ....")




cases do not even posit a test for evaluating a coverage in light of the
pertinent policy language. This oversight was corrected in 1993 by the
well-reasoned opinion of Judge Patel of the Northern District of Califor-
nia in New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Foxfire, Inc. 23
It provides, in essence, that there be: (1) advertising activity by the pol-
icyholder; (2) a claim which falls within one or more of the enumerated
advertising injury offenses; and (3) a causal nexus between the offense
and the advertising activity. The third element has generated the most
controversy. Is the causal nexus between injury and offense or offense
and advertising? Perusal of the policy language reveals that it is the lat-
ter. Recent case law confirms that the causal nexus called for by the pol-
icy language is between "offense" and "advertising activity," not "injury"
and "advertising activities. '24
C. THE LIMITED ROLE OF EXCLUSIONS IN EFFECTING THE SCOPE OF
"ADVERTISING INJURY" COVERAGE FOR ADVERTISING-BASED PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS
Insurers often rely on CGL policy exclusions for "advertisers, broad-
casters, or publishers, 25 the "knowledge of [the advertising's] falsity," 26
23. 820 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
24. Peerless Lighting Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 760-761
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("(The Policy Only Covers Offenses 'Committed in the Course of
Advertising') ... The Supreme Court held this language requires that "'advertising injury"
must have a causal connection with the insured's "advertising activities" before there can
be coverage .... Thus, Bank of the West suggests a two-part test for determining whether
an offense was committed 'in the course of advertising.' First, the promotion of the prod-
uct or service at issue must constitute 'advertising' within the meaning of the policy lan-
guage; and second, the 'advertising activities' must have in some sense caused the
'advertising injury."'). See also 1998 ISO "EXPLANATION OF CHANGES"
Revised Advertising Offenses:
Currently, the causal connection between the offense and the act of advertis-
ing is found in the "Insuring Agreement." This insurance applies to "adver-
tising injury" caused by an offense committed in the course of advertising of
goods, products or services. (p. 17)
Impact:
The change from the undefined term "advertising activities" to a defined
term "advertisement" is intended to strengthen the necessary causal connec-
tion between the covered offenses and the insured's advertisements." (p. 21)
25. In an illustrative case pertinent to cyberspace risks, a federal district court found
that policyholder DeLorme's alleged infringement of Rand McNally's trademark with its
Tripmaker CD was within the meaning of the "misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business" offense. Am. Employers Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d
64, 77 (D. Me. 1999) ("Asserting that other courts interpreting the same policy language
have concluded that the misuse of another's trademark constitutes 'misappropriation' of a
'style of doing business' . . . [and] can be described as an action for 'infringement of a
copyright, title, or slogan'...."). The court, however, disallowed coverage because it held
that DeLorme's business of designing and printing atlases and maps and developing com-
puter mapping software and databases constituted publishing and that, therefore, the al-
leged infringement fell within the insurance policy exclusion for any offense committed by
an insured "in the business of publishing." Id. at 84.
26. See Elcom Tech., Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 1294,1298 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
("[Phoenix's false advertising claim] can be proved by establishing that Elcom acted with
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and "first publication, ' 27 to bar coverage. Although many courts have
found these common exclusions to be inapplicable to intellectual prop-
erty torts, the scope of the latter is unsettled. Thus, in Arnette Optic Illu-
sions, Inc.,28 the court refused to follow the narrow construction urged in
Applied Bolting Technology Products, Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.,29 stating:
The exclusion provision refers to the "oral or written publication of
material." It mimics the provisions of the policy that relate to adver-
tising injury involving libel, slander, and invasion of privacy. In each
case, advertising injury is defined as the "oral or written publication
of material" that is slanderous or libelous or invades privacy ...
Given the duplicative language of the provision, it is a reasonable
construction of the provisions that it only applies to libel, slander and
invasion of privacy .... 30
IV. MEETING ELEMENTS ONE AND THREE OF THE
THREE-PART TEST AS APPLIED TO CLAIMS FOR
ADVERTISING-BASED PATENT INFRINGEMENT
A. SOME CLAIMS OF PATENT INDUCEMENT MAY BEAR A CAUSAL
NEXUS TO THE POLICYHOLDER'S ADVERTISING ACTIVITIES
Careful review of patent infringement law reveals that a number of
patent infringement cases bear a distinct causal nexus to advertising such
that advertising is the sole or sufficient basis for asserting liability. Claims
for inducement of infringement may be purely based upon advertising, as
many courts have found.
For example, the leading treatise on patent law states under a section
entitled "Instruction and Advertising" that "[n]umerous decisions find
active inducement where a defendant selling products capable of either
innocent or infringing use provides through labels, advertising or other
sales methods instructions and directions as to infringing use."' 3'
reckless indifference in advertising the ezPHONE as the only patented wireless telephone
jack on the market. Therefore, the knowledge of falsity exclusion does not apply ....").
27. See Arnette Optic Illusions, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Group, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096
(C.D. Cal. 1998).
28. Id.
29. 942 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd without op., 118 F.3d 1574 (3d Cir. 1997).
30. Applied Bolting, 942 F. Supp. at 1037.
31. 4 CHISUM, PATENTS, Contributory Infringement § 17.04[4][f] (1995) (emphasis ad-
ded, citations omitted). See also Applied Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd., 772 F. Supp.
1458, 1466-67 (D. Del. 1991) ("Asserting that a cause of action for inducing patent in-
fringement arises out of advertising"); Saes Getters S.P.A. v. Ergenics Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1581, 1586 n.9 (D.N.J. 1990) affd, 914 F.2d 270 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
Concluding that the mere sale of an ingredient for use in a process claimed in
a process patent did not ipso facto constitute infringement .... However, if
instructions are provided to users of the material that they should use it in
accordance with the claimed process, infringement may be found ... adver-
tising alone can state claim for infringement if the advertisement actively in-
duces another to infringe.
Rexnord, Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817, 1842 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (The
court found liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) can be established where a party takes active
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B. "OFFER FOR SALE" BASED DIRECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LAWSUITS WHICH DEPEND UPON PROOF OF THE POLICYHOLDER'S
ADVERTISING ACTIVITIES MAY TRIGGER A DEFENSE UNDER
STANDARD FORM ISO "ADVERTISING INJURY" COVERAGE
1. TRIPS Expands U.S. Patent Law Protection and Potential Coverage
to Include an "Offer for Sale," Which Claims May Bear a Clear
Nexus to a Policyholder's Advertising Activities
As amended thereby, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) now provides: "[W]hoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented inven-
tion, within the United States or imports into the United States any pat-
ented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the
patent." 32
The exclusive rights conferred upon a patent holder include a right to
sue for direct patent infringement arising from acts of "offering for sale"
for either apparatus or process patent claims, pursuant to Article 28, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), effective January 1,
1996,33 enacted on December 8, 1994 ("Uruguay Round") (i.e. "one year
after the date on which the World Trade Organization Agreement en-
tered into force with respect to the United States"). 34
President Clinton signed GATT, including the agreement known as the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), exactly
one year after the Act, on December 8, 1994.35 The requisite number of
member nations did not become signatories until December 30, 1994, so
that the effective date of the Act was January 1, 1996.36
steps to induce infringement through advertising or by providing instructions); Sims v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Asserting that promotion of the
advantages of and the marketing and sales of an item causing and encouraging others to
produce an infringing product constitutes inducing patent infringement); Johnson & John-
son v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 704 (D. Del. 1977) (Making a finding of
inducement where "Gore sells UPTFE tape to third parties for use in making threaded
pipe joints and supplies instructions, on the packaging and advertising materials, as to how
to make the patented joint."); Saf-Gard Prods., Inc. v. Serv. Parts, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 257
(D. Ariz. 1974) (Concluding that advertising and otherwise promoting the use of the ac-
cused devices in the infringing combination constitutes inducing infringement).
32. 35 U.S.C.S. § 271 (2001) (emphasis added).
33. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, title V, subtitle C, 108 Stat.
4809.
34. Uruguay Round Action § 334(a). See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, "U.S. GATT Legisla-
tion Changes Patent Term," 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 222, No. 3 (March
1995).
35. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465 (1994).
36. The purpose of the amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) was to bring the United
States into compliance with the World Trade Organizations Uruguay Round which the
United States Congress signed into law on December 8, 1994. The import of these changes
is to permit an action for direct patent infringement for "offering for sale" and "importa-
tion of a product" covered by an apparatus claim and to amend § 271(g)'s definition to
cover offering for sale and importation of a product covered by a process patent claim.
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2. Applicable Pre-GATT Insurance Coverage Case Law Addressing
Patent Infringement Claims Support Finding a Defense Following
the Expansion of the Definition of Patent Infringement to Include
Acts of "Offering for Sale"
In Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance Co.,37 the
court explained the rationale for its denial of a defense or indemnity to
claims of direct patent infringement under advertising injury policy provi-
sions covering "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business." Therein, it stated:
To compel an insurer to defend under an advertising injury provi-
sion, the insured must demonstrate a causal connection between
plaintiff's claim in the underlying action and the defendant/insured's
advertising. . . . Noting that the statutory definition of patent in-
fringement refers only to the making, using or selling of the product,
we reason that "unless Dr. Jensen's claim was that Iolab infringed his
patent in its advertising in a manner independent of a sale of the in-
traocular lens, the Jensen loss is not a form of piracy arising out of or
committed in advertising and is not covered under the policies."'38
This analysis, in turn, depended upon Judge Lynch's finding in National
Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Siliconix, Inc.,39 that claims of the direct pat-
ent infringement could not be premised upon mere acts of advertisement.
The court found that, although advertising may be connected with perti-
nent acts of sale, absent evidence that they form an independent basis for
liability there is no duty to defend. 40
The Siliconix court's reasoning relied on previous patent law cases such
as Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.41 and Merry
Manufacturing Co. v. Burns Tool Co.42 Those patent cases referenced the
distinguishable issue of whether venue could lie under the previous pat-
ent statute where there was advertising but no subsequent sale.
Although the Siliconix court's reliance on this authority to reach its
conclusion is debatable, even assuming that this analysis has merit, the
expansion of statutory liability to include acts of "offering for sale" pro-
vides a distinct and independent basis for liability which in many fact sce-
narios will have a clear nexus to the policyholder's advertising activities.
3. Pertinent Patent Case Law Addressing "Offer for Sale" Exposure
Reveals That Advertising Alone Could be a Sufficient Basis for
Establishing Liability
The first Federal Circuit decision interpreting "offer for sale" under
§ 271(a), 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Laboratories stated:
37. 23 F.3d 226, 299 (9th Cir. 1994).
38. lolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1505-06 (9th Cir. 1994). Id. at 1506
(emphasis added).
39. 726 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
40. Id. at 272.
41. 372 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1967).
42. 206 F. Supp. 53, 62 (N.D. Ga. 1962), aff'd, 335 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1964).
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[T]he tort of patent infringement due to an "offer to sell" is a federal
statutory creation which is not limited by California contract law.
The statutory character of the "offer to sell" requires us to "look
back to federal law on the conceptualization" of the "offer to sell"
itself. Here infringing solicitation letters "conveyed... a description
of the allegedly infringing merchandise and the price."'43
In Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,44 the Federal Circuit de-
fined "offer for sale" under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) according to its ordinary
meaning revealed by traditional sources of authority under federal (and
not state) common law holding it includes communications to third par-
ties, such as by advertising and is not inconsistent with its analysis.
C. RECENT COVERAGE CASE LAW REVEALS THAT WHILE NOT ALL
"OFFERS FOR SALE" DEPEND ON ADVERTISING, ADVERTISING CAN BE
A DISTINCT BASIS FOR "OFFER FOR SALE" PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Advertising, by its nature, inherently constitutes an offer for sale,
where the advertising creates a reasonable belief in the purchaser that the
invention subject to patent is being offered for sale. This is because ad-
vertising constitutes an objectively manifest attempt at exploitation.45
The Everett case explained why, in a fact pattern analogous to that
here, an advertisement creates a distinct liability for an "offer for sale"
and thereby creates exposure under that provision.46 As the Third Cir-
cuit recently opined,
For example, suppose the underlying complaint alleges patent in-
fringement, and alleges that the plaintiff lost sales because the in-
sured aggressively advertised the infringing product. Standard tort
principles (not to mention common sense) tell us that the advertising
was a cause in fact of at least a portion of the plaintiff's damages.
Courts that reason that the injury could have taken place without the
advertising, . . .are misstating the relevant tort liability principles
47
Other coverage cases are in accord on this point.48
43. 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
44. 215 F.3d 1246, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
45. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
46. Everett, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 883-884.
The Clark Court found that the new "offer to sell" language in the Patent
Act made advertising of the patented product a separate act of infringement
... the Clark Court... went on to conclude that corrective advertising dam-
ages could be appropriate and recoverable for the patent infringement.claim,
and so, the Court would not exclude evidence relevant to the issue.
47. Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., 193 F.3d at 750 n.8 (applying Pennsylvania law).
48. Maxconn, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
([TJhe amendment of the statute has nullified the argument that patent in-
fringement could not arise out of the insured's advertising activities as a mat-
ter of law. . . . Indeed, the sole allegation of wrongful conduct in the
complaint is that Maxconn, without authorization, offered for sale in an ad-
vertising brochure certain products that made use of a protected patented
invention.)
Homedics, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17317, at *6.
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V. MEETING ELEMENT TWO OF THE THREE-PART TEST
A. INSURER ARGUMENTS CONCERNING WHY No "ADVERTISING
INJURY" OFFENSES CAN ENCOMPASS ANY FORM OF PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LAWSUIT FAIL TO ADDRESS THE BASIS FOR
ESTABLISHING LIABILITY IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION
The real contest comes over element two. Insurers urge arguments as
to why such coverage may not arise under a pertinent "advertising injury"
offense. First, the offense of "infringement of title" cannot be deemed to
extend to claims for patent infringement because its fair meaning encom-
passes taking of literary or business names or appellations used by a com-
pany to promote its goods and services. 49 Second, that the offense of
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" is am-
biguous in the context of trademark infringement claims which inherently
involve advertising activity is not so as to patent infringement claims be-
cause the absence of the word "patent" in the policy makes this offense
not sufficiently flexible in that context to encompass patent infringement
lawsuits. 50 Third, whatever range of meanings the "misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business" offense is conceptually able
to encompass in the context of trademark infringement claims, there can
be no factual assertion that an "offer for sale" patent infringement claim
involves a taking of an advertising idea or style of doing business.51
(There is a causal connection between Plaintiff's advertising activity and Nik-
ken's patent infringement claim .... Here, because plaintiff may be held
liable for damages for patent infringement in the Nikken Action solely by
virtue of its advertising activity, there is a causal connection between plain-
tiff's advertising and Nikken's patent infringement claim.).
Mez, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728 n.8 ("Congress amended the Patent Act to include 'offers to
sell' (e.g., advertising) as conduct which could constitute patent infringement ... would
appear to have nullified the argument that direct patent infringement could not arise out of
an insured's advertising activities."); Advanced Polymer, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 921 n.5.
(We also note that effective January 1, 1996, after the relevant dates of the
policies at issue here and thus immaterial to this case, Congress modified the
definition of patent infringement to include "offers to sell," a change that at
least one court has found relevant to deciding whether patent infringement is
the type of offense that could occur in the course of advertising.).
49. See Maxconn, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754; Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. App. 4th
1109 (Court 1999).
50. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 363, 367-369
(E.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 94 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding in the context of claims where
no advertising link existed between the asserted patent infringement allegations of direct
infringement and the insured's liability for patent infringement, the court determined that
the "advertising injury" offenses of the "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business" and "infringement of copyright, title or slogan" were unambiguous and
could not be extended to encompass the instant patent infringement claims); Simply Fresh
Fruit, Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1996) (analyzing advertising-
deficient patent infringement allegations, the court found no duty to defend). Insurers also
cite to unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions that assert "there is no case law to support the
notion that patent infringement, even infringement based upon an 'offer for sale,' amounts
to either misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business." Franklin Miller,
Inc. v. Commerce Indus. Ins. Co., No. CV-97-8784 CAS, 2000 WL 1529240 (9th Cir.
Oct. 16, 2000) (unpublished opinion).
51. Advanced Polymer Tech., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 913 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (declining to
follow Everett and relying upon U.S. Test and holding that "infringement of ... title" of-
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For the reasons addressed hereafter, each of these arguments falls of its
own weight where the facts reveal that an infringer's advertisement pro-
motes that which the patent owner claims as his invention.
B. THE PREDECESSOR "ADVERTISING INJURY" OFFENSE OF
"PIRACY," IN THE 1976 ISO POLICY AND SOME UMBRELLA POLICY
PROVISIONS, CANNOT BE LIMITED TO PLAGIARISM OR COMMON
LAW MISAPPROPRIATION
One of the most notorious examples of improper construction of "ad-
vertising injury" coverage is the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Iolab Corp. v.
Seaboard Surety Co.52 Although the court's opinion that indemnity was
barred for claims of direct patent infringement based on sale of a product
was unremarkable in light of prior case law, its analysis of the scope of
the "piracy" offense was unnecessary to receive this result. The court
posited a definition of "advertising injury" coverage which permitted in-
demnity for the same only when an advertisement, text or logo formed
the basis for liability.53 The court claimed that the offense of piracy was
limited to common law misappropriation or plagiarism. 54 Under this
analysis, coverage for the offense of libel or slander would only be impli-
cated in a fact scenario where an advertisement, itself, contained lan-
guage, which language had within its boundaries all elements sufficient to
establish liability under the elements of libel and slander.
Further, plagiarism is not a legal cause of action, but an ethical term of
art deemed to be limited to acts that breach certain ethical rules applying
to conduct of academics, and others with like professions. No express
elements exist to be met before liability can be established. Like other
offenses within its ambit, "advertising injury" coverage necessarily in-
cludes a number of torts not the least of which are copyright infringe-
ment. It bears noting that copyright infringement is included as a
separate offense within the same policy. This leads to evident redun-
dancy in the definition. Common law misappropriation, as a derived
meaning for piracy, is equally problematic because it has been found to
fall within the ambit of unfair competition, another enumerated offense
within the policy. Further, as noted, it is separately described as an of-
fense in variant policy definitions issued contemporaneously with that au-
thored by ISO.
fense does not provide coverage for patent infringement claims even under the 1996 Patent
Act changes and that on the facts before it the "misappropriation" offense did not extend
to the claims asserted).
52. 15 F.3d 1500 (9th Cir. 1994).
53. Id.
54. The court's ruling ignores a plethora of prior court decisions and dictionary defini-
tions, as well as the fact that other variant policy forms defined those offenses separately
from piracy indicating thereby that it must have other meanings in the context of "advertis-
ing injury" coverage than that recognized by the court.
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C. THE CASES UPON WHICH THE INSURERS RELY FAIL TO PROPERLY
ANALYZE THE SCOPE OF THE "ADVERTISING INJURY" OFFENSES, OR
TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SPECIFIC STATEMENTS BY ISO TO
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES REGARDING THE SCOPE AND MEANING
OF SUCH COVERAGE
In connection with its issuance of new policy language in 1986, ISO
noted that the policy language was simplified with no change in scope. 55
This statement would lead a reasonable policyholder to believe that "ad-
vertising injury" coverage does not differ in scope from that offered by
insurers covering the offenses of "piracy" and "unfair competition. '56
As the Matthew Bender treatise acknowledges, a reasonable policy-
holder would be led to believe that the "advertising injury" coverage
would not differ in scope from that for the offenses previously labeled
"piracy." Moreover, dictionary definitions clarify that the generic offense
of "misappropriation of advertising ideas" is broad enough to encompass
claims for patent infringement.
D. PROPER ANALYSIS OF COVERAGE ISSUES REQUIRES A Focus ON
A LAY PERSON'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE MEANING OF
POLICY PROVISIONS
More thoughtful cases look to the actual offense language in light of its
plain meaning as deduced by laypersons through reference to dictionary
definitions and consider policy language in the context of the policy as a
whole.57 Such cases reveal that its meaning is far broader than common
55. ISO's previous "advertising injury" is set out in its 1976 ISO Broad Form Endorse-
ment. See ISO Circulars discussing the Broad Form Comprehensive General Liability
Endorsement.
56. As a treatise observed:
In an appropriate factual setting, this language may also cover claims of pat-
ent infringement (i.e. an alleged wrongful taking of any concept used to pub-
licize a business or wrongful taking of the manner in which a particular
commercial activity is conducted). Indeed, the Insurance Services Office
(ISO), a regulatory organization that issues policy forms routinely adopted
by industry members, widely disseminated an explanatory form entitled
"ISO General Liability Policy Revision-Highlights of Current and Revised
Contracts." It noted in its analysis of the new policy language in item 11
titled "Personal and Advertising Injury:"
Coverage in basic policy, simplified with no change in scope. Coverage trig-
gered, as in current policy, by offense committed during policy period.
MATrHEW BENDER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING AN) LIIGATION, ch. 29,
§ 29.01 p. 29 (2000).
57. See Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 971 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1992) (apply-
ing California law) ("Where a term's meaning is ambiguous, we may consult dictionary
definitions."); Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co., 519 N.W.2d 864, 869
(Mich. 1994) ("In determining what a typical lay person would understand a particular
term to mean, it is customary to consult dictionary definitions."), reh'd denied, 530 N.W.2d
745 (1994); Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 728
(Iowa 1993) ("In searching for the ordinary meaning of undefined terms in a policy, we
commonly refer to dictionaries."); Sec. State Bank v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 825 F. Supp.
944, 947 (D. Kan. 1993) ("The fact that a policy does not define each term used within it
does not somehow make the undefined term ambiguous."); McLeod v. Nationwide Mut.
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law misappropriation, assuming these wrongful acts could even properly
function as torts. Thus, Judge Lynch in the seminal 1989 case posits that
the plain meaning of the word "piracy" could encompass, in addition to
patent infringement, trademark infringement, trade secret misappropria-
tion, interference with prospective economic advantage, as well as copy-
right infringement. 58 The issue would then be whether there are any torts
which could bear a nexus to the insurer's advertising activities sufficient
to trigger coverage within the policy.
E. INSURER CONTENTIONS REGARDING THE LIMITED SCOPE OF
"ADVERTISING INJURY" POLICY LANGUAGE EVIDENCE A FAILURE TO
Focus UPON THE ELEMENTS OF THE TORT CLAIMS ANALYZED
In sum, insurers have engaged courts in a rear guard action urging revi-
sionist policy analysis in order to avoid coverage despite clear policy lan-
guage compelling a contrary result. If, as insurers contend, they never
anticipated what the scope of coverage might be if the policy language
issued, the clear remedy is that they presently adopt it, restriction of the
coverage on a foregoing basis. That action, however, cannot but establish
that the policies in place before these amendments and endorsements
were properly broad enough to provide the coverage which policyholders
can plainly see upon reading the policy language in light of the elements
of the pertinent offenses charged against them.
The problem in judicial construction originates at the point when the
court asks, "Where is the 'advertising injury'?" That is, in fact, the ulti-
mate conclusion to be established, not a question that leads to part of the
pertinent coverage analysis. This follows because the policy language
does not define the scope of coverage to be whatever the court envisions
constituted an "advertising injury" in the case before it. Rather, it re-
quires a proper, detailed and explicit application of a test derived from
the policy language, i.e., proper application of the three part test, to the
claims asserted against the policyholder.
VI. NONE OF THE PATENT COVERAGE CASES WHICH
INSURERS TYPICALLY RELY UPON JUSTIFY DENYING A
DEFENSE FOR ALL "ADVERTISING BASED" PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
Insurer arguments, vis-A-vis the alleged lack of coverage for patent in-
fringement lawsuits, should be rejected for the following reasons:
First, for the reasons noted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska analyz-
ing Nebraska law in Union Insurance Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc.,59 a defense
Ins. Co., 444 S.E.2d 487, 491-92 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) ("In the absence of policy definitions,
the court must define a term or phrase 'consistent with the context in which it is used and
the meaning accorded it in ordinary speech.' In doing so, courts are encouraged to use
'standard, non-legal dictionaries' as a guide.").
58. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
59. 529 N.W.2d 773 (Neb. 1995).
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could arise for claims of patent infringement that may depend on adver-
tising alone to establish liability, such as those for inducement and "offer
for sale" infringement. 60
Second, the majority of cases upon which the insurers rely analyze di-
rect patent infringement claims for the sale of a product covered by a
utility patent claim in an analysis of the duty of indemnity, not as a
defense. 61
Third, some cases analyzing advertising-based patent infringement
claims, such as those for inducement, have failed to find a defense fo-
cused on the offense of "infringement of ... title," not "misappropriation
of advertising ideas or style of doing business" as urged herein. 62
Fourth, the majority of trial judges to address the issue have found ad-
vertising-based patent infringement claims, such as those based on in-
ducement, covered where the covered offense was the predecessor
offense of "piracy" or "unfair competition." Reversals of these rulings
have typically depended on public policy concerns limited to allegations
of inducement which do not impact "offer for sale" liability.63 Indeed,
absent Insurance Code § 533 considerations, many courts have found that
inducement of patent infringement claims trigger coverage where
"piracy" or "unfair competition" offense language is in place. 64 No such
argument can be applied to "offer for sale" patent claims that do not
60. R.L. Chaides Constr., 847 F. Supp. at 1458 ("Inducement, defined as infringement
by § 271[b] is the active and knowing aiding or abetting of another's direct infringement");
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(holding that inducement constitutes infringement under § 271(b) and advertising has been
found to be a sufficient basis for a claim of inducement); Omnitel, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1937-
38.
61. lolab, 15 F.3d at 1505-06 ("[The] infringement, was not a form of piracy arising out
of or committed in advertising and thus was not covered by the policies."); Everest, 23 F.3d
at 229 ("E&J concedes that Burke's complaint alleges infringement based on manufacture
or sale only, and does not even mention E&J's advertising... under the plain language of
the policy, E&J could not reasonably expect coverage.").
62. U.S. Test, 196 F.3d at 1381-82. (The court did not analyze the misappropriation
offense or draw any conclusions about liability therein but did note that "piracy" could
incorporate patent infringement claims under Louisiana law. Pursuant to ISO pronounce-
ments, the new offense of "misappropriation of advertising ideas" has no change in scope
from "piracy"; thus its analysis supports finding a duty to defend on these facts.)
63. Omnitel, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1935 (holding that coverage arises for inducing contribu-
tory patent infringement claims); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Del Astra Indus., Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
1317 (N.D. Cal. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 35 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
coverage arises for inducing/contributory patent infringement claims); Big Sur Waterbeds,
Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., No. CV92-4298-WMB, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22596, at *12
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 1992) ("There is a wide range of authority for the idea that piracy or
unfair competition can be construed to include patent infringement."); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Watercloud Bed Co., No. CV 88-200AHS, 1988 WL 252578, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
17 1988) ("piracy" and "unfair competition" encompass patent infringement).
64. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Advanced Interventional Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp.
583, 587 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("Pillco's second claim, that AIS induced others to infringe
Pillco's patents by advertising its infringing product .... does clear one of the hurdles,
because any successful claim premised on that theory would certainly 'result from' the
advertising of AIS's products.") affd on alternative grounds, 21 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1994).
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implicate any scienter in order to establish liability.65
Fifth, cases acknowledge that advertising-based patent infringement
claims for inducement and "offer for sale" infringement may bear a
causal nexus to the insured's advertising activities and that the "piracy"
or "unfair competition" offense may encompass patent claims but deny a
defense because the claims at issue do not depend on advertising.66
Sixth, cases relying on an overly technical reading of the scope of the
undefined offenses of "piracy" are contrary to the reasonable expecta-
tions of a layperson's understanding of that generic and lay offense which
does not track any single recognized common law or statutory torts.67 In
Iolab, the court properly points out that the issue is not what the isolated
term "piracy" could mean, but what "piracy" "occurring in the course of
advertising activity" reasonably could mean. The court then erroneously
concludes, however, that viewed in context, piracy cannot encompass pat-
ent infringement because the claims for direct infringement based on sale
of a product could not bear a causal nexus to the insured's advertising
activities. 68
65. Mez Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Nat'l Ins. Co., 76 Cal. App. 4th 856, 866 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) ("[T]his statutory change would appear to have nullified the argument that direct
patent infringement could not arise out of an insured's advertising activities.").
66. Davila v. Arlasky, 857 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
(While inducing infringement may involve advertising activity, that does not
appear to be true here .... Because the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate
any causal connection between the alleged patent infringement and any ad-
vertising activity, we find that the Insurers and Great Southwest are not obli-
gated under their policies to defend or indemnify.).
R.L. Chaides Constr., 847 F. Supp. at 1458 ("Inducement, defined as infringement by sec-
tion 271(b), is the active and knowing aiding or abetting of another's direct infringe-
ment."); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Tech., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Or. 1996); Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 363, 365 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
(noting that the insured stipulated that there was no advertising component to the asser-
tion of liability against it, both for direct and inducement of patent infringement); Gencor
Indus., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 1560, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
(While the court gave scant reference to inducement of the patent infringement claim, the
parties conceded that there was no exposure for advertising conduct under the claims as-
serted against them.); Fluoroware, Inc. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 545 N.W.2d 678, 682
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (analyzing briefly inducement claims but finding no causal nexus
implicated by the facts asserted).
67. Tradesoft Tech., Inc. v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., 746 A.2d 1078, 1086 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000) (following the discredited Advance Watch line of cases under New Jersey
law, the court held that the proposition that the "misappropriation" offenses do not even
extend to trademark, much less any other tort); lolab, 15 F.3d at 1506 ("'piracy' means
misappropriation or plagiarism found in the elements of the advertisement itself-in the
text form, logo, or pictures rather than in the product being advertised"). Subsequent
cases rely on this analysis of olab in denying a defense for inducing for patent infringe-
ment claims based on "piracy." AtI. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Biotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 429-
430 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Gencor, 857 F. Supp. at 1566; I.C.D. Indus., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 879 F.
Supp. 480, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
68. But see, e.g., Siliconix, 729 F. Supp. at 79 (finding that the term "piracy" could
incorporate patent infringement, but not addressing claims for inducement of patent in-
fringement); Owens-Brockway, 884 F. Supp. at 365 (noting that policy terms including "un-
fair competition" or "piracy" are somewhat open ended terms on which expansive claims
of coverage have traditionally been laid, in contrast to the policy language analyzed by the
court in Owens-Brockway); Siliconix, 726 F. Supp. at 272 (In a companion decision, the
court refused to consider whether claims for inducing patent infringement, might also fall
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Seventh, the analysis of a number of decisions relied upon by the court
erroneously presume that patent infringement cannot trigger "advertising
injury" coverage because liability premised on advertising is not available
for any version of this tort.69
Eighth, many issues raised by the insurers are inconsistent with their
contentions that coverage for piracy cannot encompass claims for patent
infringement. 70 Insurers would have courts narrowly rewrite the applica-
ble policy language to provide limitations on coverage inconsistent with
the representations of their principal drafter, the Insurance Services Of-
fice, regarding the scope of these policies to the majority of state insur-
ance regulators.
Ninth, the insurers fail to consider the nature of this "advertising in-
jury" coverage in a Commercial General Liability policy sold to a manu-
facturer or distributor which expressly excludes coverage for advertisers,
and the aspects of patent infringement liability for "offer for sale" patent
infringement claims like those asserted against Coustic herein which im-
plicate the "misappropriation" offenses. 71 Patent infringement coverage
cases that properly address the mechanism for assertion of liability in the
underlying action reveal why coverage may arise.72 So too, copyright in-
fringement coverage cases that look at how liability may manifest itself in
within the logic of its argument that allegations of patent infringement even though they
might constitute "piracy" and could bear a causal relationship to the insured's advertising
activities, so as to trigger a defense).
69. See Flodine, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2204, at *27-33.
(Generally, however, "style of doing business" and "advertising idea" should
not be interpreted to cover wrongful takings that occur independently of ad-
vertising and are merely propagated, compounded, or contributed to by ad-
vertising, such as patent infringement or trade secret theft claims. Flodine's
alleged offenses occurred in the course of advertising her products, because
the tags functioned as mini-ads that were tied to the products, clearly promo-
tional in nature yet distinct from the products themselves).
See Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining advertising to include statements
"printed on or contained in any tag or label attached to or accompanying any
merchandise").
70. In an Excess Overlayer Indemnity Policy, Aetna acknowledged that "piracy" and
"plagiarism" are separate and distinct offenses. By force of the same argument relied on
by Aetna, if "piracy" were interpreted to refer to "plagiarism," the term "piracy" would be
surplusage in its Excess Overlayer Policies, as typically issued to a variety of policyholders.
Moreover, if piracy encompasses "idea misappropriation," then what does this distinct of-
fense in Aetna and Hartford's policy cover? If Aetna truly understood "piracy" to mean
the same thing as "plagiarism," or "idea misappropriation" for that matter, it certainly
would not have included both terms in its referenced excess policy.
71. SST Fitness Corp., 182 F.3d at 450 (The court, purporting to apply Ohio law, fol-
lowed the Advance Watch decision analysis limiting misappropriation to common law mis-
appropriation, contrary to California law, as specifically observed in Lebas.); Heritage
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Advanced Polymer Tech., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 913, 927 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(without analyzing "offer for sale" patent infringement claims, holding that the advertising
nexus to patent infringement did not implicate acts involving sale of products through ad-
vertisements depicting elements of that which was protected by the patent infringement
claims at issue).
72. Everett, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 884.
([U]nder the Clark Court's express ruling, Everett could have been held lia-
ble at trial for damages for patent infringement solely by virtue of its having
advertised infringing products. In light of this, it is difficult to say how Trans-
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the underlying action properly analyze whether the "offense" of copy-
right infringement may bear a causal nexus to the plaintiff's claims in a
given fact scenario.73
Tenth, should the insurers have desired to avoid any potential for cov-
erage of patent infringement lawsuits, they could have sought to expressly
exclude patent infringement actions.74
VII. DESPITE INSURER ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY,
RECENT CALIFORNIA COVERAGE CASES WHICH AROSE
AFTER EVERETT DO NOT UNDERCUT ITS SALIENT
ANALYSIS OF THE UNDERLYING "OFFER FOR SALE"
PATENT INFRINGEMENTS AS A KEY PILLAR OF ITS
COVERAGE ANALYSIS
A. THE MAXCONN CASE
Maxconn, Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange,75 in which the court found
continental could prove the absence of any potential for advertising injury
coverage.).
EKCO Group, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., Civil No. 99-236-JD, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17702, at *32-33 (D.N.H. Nov. 29, 2000).
(Courts have also held that the definition of advertising injury as an injury
arising out of the "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business" does not include claims of patent infringement.... As is discussed
above, however, this court is not persuaded by the narrow analysis of the
misappropriation definition .... Infringement of a design patent requires
that the designs have the same general visual appearance, such that it is likely
that the purchaser would be deceived into confusing the design of the ac-
cused article with the patented design." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 162 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The
design patent claim alleged in the underlying suit here is sufficiently similar
to the trade dress infringement claim to permit a reasonable insured to ex-
pect coverage for the same reasons previously discussed in the context of
trade dress infringement.).
73. Interface, Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 1:99-CV-1485-MHS, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10419, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2000).
(According to CAF's complaint, Interface infringes its copyrights every time
it displays, produces, distributes or sells carpet bearing the infringing pattern.
Under the Copyright Act, infringement occurs when 'any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner' are violated. 17 U.S.C. § 501. These exclusive
rights include '(1) the right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ... ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to dis-
tribute copies.., to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership ... ; and
(5) to display the copyrighted work publicly.' 17 U.S.C. § 106. Under CAF's
theory, then, anytime Interface does any of the aforementioned activities
with respect to carpets bearing the infringing pattern, CAF is injured." (omis-
sions in text).
74. Indeed, Aetna sought to do precisely that in its primary policy form which had
virtually identical language to the policy sold by Hartford herein, but also included an
express exclusion for patent infringement claims. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Centennial
Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 346, 349 (9th Cir. 1988); Pardee Constr. Co. v. Ins. Co. of the West, 77
Cal. App. 4th 1340, 1360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 740, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("If the parties had intended
coverage to be limited to the [extent] suggested by the defendants [the insurers], language
clearly embodying that intention was available.")).
75. 74 Cal. App. 4th 1267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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no duty to defend arose from an "offer for sale" patent infringement
claim.
The court conceded that these claims established a causal nexus to the
insured's advertising activities. It reasoned:
For purposes of this appeal, Truck concedes that the Amphenol com-
plaint alleges conduct by Maxconn that occurred in the course of its
advertising activities. Indeed, the sole allegation of wrongful con-
duct in the complaint is that Maxconn, without authorization, offered
for sale in an advertising brochure certain products that made use of
a protected patented invention.76
The only issue before the court was whether the offense of "infringe-
ment of title" could encompass the pertinent "offer for sale" patent in-
fringement claims. In ruling against the policyholder, the court purported
to rely upon prior precedent. However, none of the cases the court cited
were apposite for the simple reason that with one exception, these cases
all found that there was no causal nexus to the insured's advertising
activities.77
The one exception to this trend is St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co. v.
Advanced Interventional Systems, Inc.78 Therein, the court conceded that
claims for inducement could bear a causal nexus to the insured's advertis-
ing activities, but concluded that neither St. Paul's offenses for "infringe-
ment of ... title" nor "unauthorized taking of advertising ideas" could
encompass such claims. This was because the court believed that the first
offense's omission of patent infringement meant it could not be included
therein and that the later offense was limited only to the statutory tort of
trade dress infringement. Neither narrow view of these general lay of-
fenses has withstood scrutiny. 79
In its modified opinion, the Maxconn court recognized that its ruling
regarding "infringement of title" did not preclude the court from revisit-
ing, on remand, the issue of whether the offense of "misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business" might encompass "offer for
sale" patent infringement claims. Its opinion was expressly limited to an-
alyzing the only offense urged in the lower court-"infringement of...
title." Although the court found that this offense could not reasonably
accomplish the concededly advertising-based "offer for sale" patent in-
fringement claims, it did not address the issue of whether that offense in
this context was ambiguous. This is especially troublesome if the court
finds that this offense can have two distinct reasonable meanings, thereby
76. Id. at 1274.
77. See Owens-Brockway, 884 F. Supp. at 367; Gencor, 857 F. Supp. at 1564; Herman
Miller, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 162 F.3d 454, 455 (6th Cir. 1998); Julian v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 682 A.2d 611, 616 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
78. 824 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff"d without op., 21 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 1994).
79. McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d
168 (Mo. 1999) (en banc); Fibreboard, 16 Cal. App. 4th 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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conceding its ambiguity under applicable California law. 80
Equally unpersuasive is the Maxconn court's reliance on narrow case
law from the Sixth Circuit which is inconsistent with the way a reasonable
layperson would believe the phrase should be interpreted.81 The court's
deficient analysis is highlighted by its discussion of Sentex.8 2 It criticizes
the Sentex court's 1995 trial court opinion because it did not distinguish
cases decided after that decision. In the end the court's argument relies
on one legal argument to justify its analysis-"the absence of an expres-
sion or word in a policy is clearly an appropriate consideration in the
interpretation of contracts. ' 83 However, this approach assumes that the
insurer used tort terms to define offenses. Clearly they did not do so.84
B. THE MEZ CASE
1. The Court's Analysis Applies Only to Claims of Inducement Under
California Coverage Law, Not "Offer For Sale" Patent Infringement
Exposure
The Mez 85 court's opinion independently confirms the view that patent
infringement claims pursuant to § 271(a) which predate the GATT
Amendment effective January 1, 1996, and based solely on acts of sale
would not trigger a defense based on prior case law. Its opinion stopped
there. The Mez court specifically distinguished "offer for sale" patent
infringement claims based on the court reasoning in Everett.86
80. Thus the court states: "We conclude that the term infringement of title is a refer-
ence to any infringement of a legally protected name, appellation or designation..." Max-
conn, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 1269.
The term "infringement of title" is part of a list that includes copyright and
slogan. In company with these terms, "title" apparently refers to a name,
such as a name of a literary or artistic work, rather than to ownership of an
invention or other thing ... We recognize that there is a split of authority
concerning whether the word title must be narrowly interpreted to apply only
to the title of an artistic or literary work or may refer to any type of name or
designation, including that of a business. Here we determine only that title is
a reference to a legally protected name, appellation or designation.
Id. at 1276, 1277 n.4.
81. See Lebas Fashion Imports of U.S.A., Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 50 Cal.
App. 4th 548, 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
82. See Maxconn, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 1267-69.
83. Id. at 1279.
84. See McCormack Baron, 989 S.W.2d at 171 ("The word 'offense' cannot be read to
limit coverage only to a particular 'cause of action' or 'claim.' The word 'offense' simply
does not have this meaning in either common usage or legal usage.").
85. Mez Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Nat'l Ins. Co., 90 Cal Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
86. The Mez court explained:
Assuming arguendo that the Everett court reached a proper result, a matter
on which we express no opinion, this statutory change would appear to have
nullified the argument that direct patent infringement could not arise out of
an insured's advertising activity. However, the Amendment has no impact
on the issue before us because the alleged misconduct of Mez occurred prior
to 1996 and Mez makes no claim for coverage based upon Ductmate's allega-
tions of patent infringement. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 866 n.8.
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While the Mez court does spend time analyzing why claims for "in-
fringement of ... title" may not provide coverage in an inducement of
patent infringement case, it does not engage in any extended analysis re-
specting the "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing busi-
ness" offense. This despite the fact that it was that offense that the
Everett court specifically found ambiguous and sufficiently broad when
interpreted against the insurer who drafted it to encompass claims of "of-
fer for sale" patent infringement.
Given the Mez court's express reference to Everett and failure to take
issue with Everett's analysis of the causation element in an "offer for sale"
patent case, it makes little sense to find that the court definitively fore-
closed coverage for "offer for sale" patent infringement claims under the
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" offense.
To the extent the court's view is that the Mez decision provided other-
wise, it is appropriate to note the Mez court's refusal to extend liability to
a patent inducement claim was based on its misunderstanding of how lia-
bility attaches thereunder. Critical to the Mez court's analysis was its be-
lief that "damages would flow.., through the sale of [Mez's] products. 87
This is directly contrary to the facts in Everett and here, in which adver-
tising alone creates both liability and a damage remedy for "offer for
sale" patent infringement. 88
2. Mez's Limited Analysis of Patent Inducement Claims Does Not
Perforce Bar Potential Coverage for Advertising-Based "Offer for
Sale" Patent Infringement Claims Under the "Misappropriation"
Offenses Pertinent Here
Mez offers no substantive analysis of why the "misappropriation" of-
fenses, even though they embrace multiple, reasonable definitions, may
not encompass claims for advertising-based "offer for sale" infringement,
much less advertising-based claims for inducement.
As the Mez court noted,
We... use the same criteria as we did in Lebas, but in the context of
the facts in this case, we reach an entirely different result. We do not
see how Mez's inducement of the infringement of Ductmate's partic-
ular patents reasonably could be considered to be the misappropria-
tion of an "advertising idea" or "style of doing business."..... In the
context of the facts and circumstances of this case, the policy terms
S.. could not be reasonably read by a layperson to include either
patent infringement or the inducement thereof.89
87. Id. at 877.
88. See Everett, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 883-84 ("[Corrective] advertising damages could be
appropriate and recoverable for the patent infringement claim ... therefore .... Everett
could have been held liable ... for damages for patent infringement solely by virtue of its
having advertised infringing products.")




The Everett court's order cites this language in part but then takes the
further step of finding that the Mez court limited the reasoning of Lebas
to a trademark infringement scenario. This is not so. It simply did not
find the inducement scenario, again based on its misperception of how
liability would flow therein, to fall within the misappropriation offenses.
The Mez court was misled by erroneous factual statements in the in-
surer's brief therein. Contrary to the insurer's characterizations of how
liability would attach in the underlying action in Mez, inducement liabil-
ity is complete when an advertisement induces "use" potentially consti-
tuting direct infringement by another. Specification of a competing
product would be actionable as "use" without any sale of the component
duct product; an inducement of such "use" by advertising is indepen-
dently actionable. 90 The subheading above for all of the above is con-
trary to the contentions of Hartford.
One court concedes that the misappropriation "offenses" may have
more than one reasonable meaning, noting:
[t]ogether the misappropriation of advertising ideas would mean the
unauthorized taking of an idea about the solicitation of business. The
Complaint filed by Intermatic never suggests that Lamson took its
advertising idea without authorization. The Complaint and the May
13 Pretrial Order allege infringement of a patent, clearly different
from a claim alleging that Lamson took an idea about how to solicit
business or advertise a product.91
The court does not explain, however, why an "offer for sale" patent in-
fringement case could not be about the patent owner's ability to exclude
others from "offering for sale" via advertisements the inventive idea.
3. The Mez Court Did Not Find That Its Analysis in Lebas Only
Supported a Finding That Trademark Infringement Could
Reasonably Be Construed by a Insured Layperson to Constitute an
"Advertising Idea" or "Style of Doing Business"
Properly understood in light of the liability which would attach under
the advertising-based "offer for sale" patent infringement, where a defen-
dant advertised that which the patent owner claims as his invention, such
claims may fall within a reasonable definition of the offense of "misap-
propriation of advertising ideas."
First, ISO, which drafted the policy language at issue, did not limit its
scope to known categories of risk (i.e., specifically defined intellectual
property torts).
Second, the Mez opinion did not adopt any singular plain meaning for
the misappropriation offenses in an advertising-based inducement of pat-
90. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(holding that infringer's advertising before infringing product was "offered for sale" sup-
ported damage for sale as "price erosion").
91. Lamson & Sessions Co. v Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 1:99 CV 1013, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10042, at *19 (N.D. Ohio, June 13, 2000).
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ent infringement setting or otherwise. "This policy's language, given its
ordinary meaning, does not limit itself to the misappropriation of an ac-
tual advertising text. It is concerned with 'ideas,' a broader term."92 It
may also properly include, as the Third Circuit recently found: "[A]n idea
about advertising ... (the idea of claiming a revolutionary new design as
an enticement to customers), ... an 'idea for calling public attention to a
product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to
increase sales or patronage' or "an idea about the solicitation of
business."'93
Third, under the linguistic logic of the policy language, its meaning may
include "the taking of the subject matter of that which is advertised (ideas
causing advertising, ideas for advertising). '94 "Advertising ideas" may be
understood as a gerund (verb plus its subject) as in "considering alterna-
tives." Such phrases have the interpretation of the act or process of Verb-
ing NOUN. The phrase is a complex nominal (noun-noun compound). It
can have at least a dozen interpretations. So understood, it is appropriate
to look at the ambiguity of the various meanings which the misappropria-
tion phrase can have as analyzed in the context of advertising-based "of-
fer for sale" patent infringement claims.
Fourth, a number of courts have found forms of patent infringement
readily create coverage where the policy at issue covered the predecessor
"advertising injury" offense of "piracy." 95
C. No PUBLISHED CASE LAW APPLICABLE IN CALIFORNIA SUPPORTS
DENIAL OF A DEFENSE FOR ALL PATENT CLAIMS UNDER THE
"MISAPPROPRIATION" OFFENSE, No MATTER WHAT THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THEORY OF RECOVERY UNDER THE
PATENT CLAIMS ASSERTED AND THE DEFENDANT'S ADVERTISEMENTS
The alleged wrongful conduct in either a design patent or trademark
infringement claim may constitute a "misappropriation of an advertising
idea" because the character of the public's association of a particular set
of product features with a source may be confused to the extent that an
alleged misappropriation may be implied where patent claims are as-
serted regarding same.
92. Sentex, 93 F.3d at 580.
93. Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., 193 F.3d at 749.
94. Id.
95. U.S. Test, 196 F.3d at 1382 ("[P]atent infringement is often referred to as piracy in
that the infringer is considered to have pirated the patented invention."); Omnitel, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1933(coverage arises for inducing contributory patent infringement claims);
Aqua Queen Mfg. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins., 830 F. Supp. 536 (C.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 46 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that coverage arises for direct patent
infringement claims); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Del Astra Inds., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1317 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that coverage arises for inducing/contributory patent infringement claims);
Watercloud Bed, 1988 WL 252578, at *6-7 (holding that "piracy" and "unfair competition"
encompass patent infringement); Big Sur Waterbeds, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22596, at *12
("There is a wide range of authority for the idea that piracy or unfair competition can be
construed to include patent infringement.").
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The Mez court decision is not controlling because the court specifically
refused to address "offer for sale" patent infringement claims, distin-
guished Everett, and did not discuss the scope of misappropriation as it
would apply in the distinct context of a case premised upon advertising as
a basis for both liability and damages. This followed because it improp-
erly presumed that an inducement claim would be premised on an act of
sale of product, not its advertisement. It is clearly not the case with re-
gard to "offer for sale" patent infringement liability.
Claims of advertising-based "offer for sale" patent infringement based
on the "use" of the description of process patents in the advertising of an
accused defendant may constitute "misappropriation of advertising
ideas" because the description of a process patent constitutes an advertis-
ing idea that is inherent in the rights granted to a patent holder. In this
context, the absence of the word "patent" is no more significant than the
absence of the word "trademark. '96
Any court rulings that urge that there must be an express allegation of
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business," when
no torts exist under that rubric, is nonsensical. 97 Further, a number of
courts have found that patent infringement lawsuits may trigger a duty to
defend under CGL language that preceded that issued herein covering
the offenses of "piracy" and "unfair competition. '98
VIII. CASE LAW WHICH DIRECTLY ADDRESSES THE SCOPE
OF THE "MISAPPROPRIATION" OFFENSES TO CLAIMS FOR
ADVERTISING-BASED PATENT INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION EVIDENCES WHY, IN CONSORT WITH THE
MEZ ANALYSIS, A DEFENSE COULD BE TRIGGERED
A. ANALOGOUS DESIGN PATENT CLAIMS BASED ON AN "OFFER FOR
SALE" MAY FALL WITHIN THE "MISAPPROPRIATION" OFFENSE AS THE
ONLY COURT TO SUBSTANTIVELY ADDRESS THAT ISSUE So FOUND
In EKCO Group, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois,99 the court,
analyzing a 1986 ISO policy under New Hampshire law, found that there
96. Lebas Fashion Imports of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 50 Cal. App. 4th
548, 566 n.13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., Inc., 897 F. Supp.
1213, 1216 (W.D. Ark. 1995).
(Those draftsman had it within their power to make clear the full scope of
the coverage offered as well as any limitations they wished to place thereon.
Their failure to do so cannot justify our rejection of an insured's objectively
reasonable expectations as to coverage which arise from the words chosen by
the drafters).
97. Lebas, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 560, 565; Tinseltown Video, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 61
Cal. App. 4th 184, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 16 Cal. App. 4th 492, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("To the extent the listed
offenses [in the policy] are framed in generic terms, they should be construed broadly to
encompass all specific torts which reasonably could fall within the general category.").
98. See Lebas, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 565 n.13.
99. No. 99-236-JD, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17702 (D.N.H. Nov. 29, 2000) rev'd, No. 01-
1029, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 26295, (1st Cir. Dec. 10, 2001).
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was indemnity for the patent design claim. The court stated, "More re-
cently, in light of the amendment of § 271 in 1996 to include 'offers to
sell' as actionable infringement, courts have found that patent infringe-
ment based on allegations of offers to sell may be causally related to
advertising."'100
Concluding that the causal nexus was met on the facts before it, the
court found:
The allegations pertaining to infringement of the design patent are
substantially the same as the allegations of trade dress infringement.
The appearance of the tea kettles was a form of advertising used to
call public attention to the kettles for purposes of selling them.
EKCO infringed Chantal's design patent when the infringing kettles
were offered for sale and sold. Therefore, the patent infringement
claimed in the complaint was caused, in part, by EKCO offering for
sale its tea kettles that were advertised by appearance to be Chantal
tea kettles.10'
On December 10, 2001, the First Circuit'0 2 reversed the prior ruling,
focusing on the perceived absence of a casual nexus between EKCO's
advertising and the concededly triggered offense of "misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business.' 0 3 The court observed that
"a distinctively designed teapot could, assuming secondary meaning, be
seen as both a concrete product and as an insignia triggering a favorable
association in the public's mind with the manufacturer, just as an ordinary
trademark devise or name might do. 10 4 The court presumed that the case
was one about "product copying," and noted that "surely no one
imagines that a policy covering 'advertising injury' was intended to pro-
vide coverage for ordinary patent violations."10 5
The court's restrictive definition of advertising would limit it to in-
stances of "oral or written publication of material" despite the fact that
this phrase does not modify the "misappropriation" coverage at issue.
The court creates a new test not retrieved from a careful reading of the
policy language, to wit, that there must be some casual connection run-
ning from the offense through the advertising to the injury."' 0 6
In analysis directly contrary to that of the majority of jurisdictions to
address the issue, it stated:
Nothing in the Chantal complaint suggests that it was concerned
with EKCO's design of its brochures or annual reports or that the
100. Id. at *34-35 (citing Heritage Mut. Ins., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 921 n.5; Everett, 57 F.
Supp. 2d at 881-83).
101. Id. at *36.
102. EKCO Group v. Travelers Indemnity Co., No. 01-1029, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
26295 (1st Cir. Dec. 10, 2001).
103. The court did note that: "Needless to say, the advertising injury provision is, at
least in certain applications, unclear and has provoked a good deal of litigation." Id. at *5-
*6.
104. Id. at *9 (citing I.P. Lund Trading ApS & Kronin, Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27,
51-52 (1st Cir. 1998) (concurring opinion)).
105. Id. at *12.
106. Id. at *14-*15.
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graphics or typography were invented by or borrowed from Chantal.
The misappropriation offenses charged by Chantal in its complaint
were the physical reproduction and sale of a look-alike teapot by
EKCO. The physical reproduction and sale were not done "in the
course of" making brochures or annual reports. The latter is adver-
tising, to be sure, but not where the offenses charged by Chantal
occurred.10 7
The insurer bears the burden to choose clear effective terminology.
The fact that it is difficult to actuarially protect against advertising injury
risks is an inherent element of offense-based coverage. It applies as
equally to any construction of the copright infringement coverage as that
at issue in this case for the amorphous and diffuse lay offense of "misap-
propriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business." It is of no
moment in insurance coverage analysis.
B. UNPUBLISHED CASES DENYING COVERAGE FOR "OFFER TO SALE"
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS UNDER THE "MISAPPROPRIATION"
OFFENSES Do NOT WITHSTAND CLOSE ANALYSIS
The deficient analysis of court opinions that have not followed this
logic are well illustrated by Lamson & Sessions Co. v. Indemnity Insur-
ance Co. of North America.108
First, the court stated:
By analogy, Plaintiff's argument that "misappropriation of style of
doing business" is likewise without merit. Again, assuming the defi-
nition of misappropriation to be an unauthorized taking or use of
interests, the definition of "style of doing business" in the broadest
sense is the comprehensive style of operating a company. Nothing in
the Complaint filed by Intermatic or the May 13 Pretrial Order sug-
gest that Intermatic was alleging that Lamson took without authori-
zation the comprehensive style of operating the company. 10 9
Second, the word "comprehensive" appears nowhere in the policy
form. To import a new limiting term not written by the insurer is to re-
draft the policy for its benefit, directly contrary to rules of policy con-
struction. Where the manner of advertising of an allegedly copycat
product created damage exposure for "corrective advertising" or "price
erosion," reading the "misappropriation" offenses to encompass such
claims is hardly a far stretch.1 10
107. Id. at *15-*16.
108. No. 1:99 CV 1013, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10042 (N.D. Ohio June 13, 2000).
109. Id. at *20-21.
110. See Heritage Mut. Ins., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 926 (noting that "misappropriation of
advertising ideas" could encompass the "wrongful taking of an idea about the solicitation
of business," but found it inapplicable because "Environ's complaint fails to even hint at
APT's wrongful taking of any Environ idea about how to solicit business or advertise the
piping product." The court intimated that, if there was proof that Environ claimed that the
use of the phrase "patent pending" was "an advertising idea" such that the insured took an
"idea about advertising," such allegations could create coverage.).
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Third, the court's analysis is based on a misunderstanding of patent
law. To-wit, it states, "The problem with this argument is that a patent
protects technical achievement, not ideas.""'1 A protectable invention is
simply the embodiment of an idea with some practical and functional
benefit.' 12 Indeed, a business methodology may be patented. There is no
"technical achievement" required.
Fourth, the Lamson court relied on Sixth Circuit authority, limiting the
meaning of the "misappropriation" offense to common law misappropria-
tion. This is not good law in the majority of jurisdictions.
Fifth, the "offer for sale" patent infringement coverage cases the court
cites fail, as does the court, to weigh the significance of the fact that, in
many "offer for sale" patent infringement lawsuits, liability and damages
are dependent on advertising alone.
In Franklin Miller, Inc. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co.,113 the court
opined that a patent does not provide similar protection as does a trade-
mark for an advertising idea or style of doing business."14 But the court
did not analyze what protection would be provided under an "offer for
sale" analysis or appreciate that advertising liability for the sole act of
promoting goods, products and services duplicative of those protected by
the patent claims was within the scope of patent protection.
The Hartford court did not determine if the "misappropriation" of-
fense could cover the alleged infringing advertisement of the inventive
idea that is the heart of patented inventions." 5
111. Lamson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10042, at *20 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
112. Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1255 ("[A]n object of the patent law as important as providing
incentives to invent: disclosing new ideas to the public."); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Conception is the.., completion of the
mental part of invention... [Conception requires] an idea that was definite and permanent
enough that one skilled in the art could understand the invention."), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1070 (1996); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku, 234 F.3d 558, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The
encouragement of invention and investment in new ideas and their embodiments is a pri-
mary function of patent systems aimed at the national purpose of development of new
industries, improved productivity, increased employment, and overall economic growth as
well as technologic advance.").
113. No. CV-97-8784 CAS (AN), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18601 (C.D. Cal. July 13,
1998).
114. Id. at *10-12.
115. Homedics, Inc. v. CIGNA Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., No. SA CV 99-1352 DOC
(AN), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8927, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2000) (analyzing "offer for
sale" patent infringement but without appreciating that advertising could create liability,
and setting forth a factual showing to constitute a "misappropriation of an advertising idea
or style of doing business."); Epoch Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 98-35667,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29472, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 1999) (applying Washington law);
Precision Automation, Inc. v. West Am. Ins. Co., No. D-99-35184, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
31378, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 24, 1999) (applying Oregon law) (noting that no court had yet
addressed the "offer for sale" nexus to misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business and in so finding expressly did not consider the Everett court's analysis
finding it ambiguous and reaching a contrary conclusion based on an understanding of the
underlying tort elements asserted therein).
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IX. A RECENT ILLINOIS FEDERAL COURT DECISION
ANALYZING STATUTORY ALLEGATIONS THAT STATE
ANALOGOUS CLAIMS TO A SUIT FOR "PALMING OFF"/
UNFAIR COMPETITION PROVIDES A COGENT RATIONALE
WHICH SUPPORTS FINDING A DEFENSE UNDER THE
"MISAPPROPRIATION" OFFENSES ON THE FACTS HEREIN
In Flodine v. State Farm Insurance Co.,116 the court distinguishes cover-
age for cases analyzing patent and trade secret claims under the "misap-
propriation" offenses. The court explained, "[g]enerally, however, 'style
of doing business' and 'advertising idea' should not be interpreted to
cover wrongful takings that occur independently of advertising and are
merely propagated, compounded, or contributed to by advertising, such
as patent infringement or trade secret theft claims."' 117 The general pre-
sumption of "no coverage" is clearly premised on the absence of advertis-
ing as the basis for liability. Advertising, however, may not only be a
basis for liability but for damage as well as in an "offer for sale" patent
infringement case.118 While the presence of a causal connection based on
advertising does not in and of itself answer the question as to the proper
scope of the misappropriation offense, it at least makes an "offer for sale"
based patent infringement claim a worthy candidate for further coverage
consideration.
Analyzing a particular statutory offense for falsely representing that
goods marketed and promoted were "authentic Indian-made," the
Flodine court found such claims analogous to "passing off."119 The same
can be said of patent infringement claims based upon the patent owner's
right to exclude infringers from "offering for sale" via their advertise-
ments the substance of an invention which is protected by patent
claims.' 20 Numerous International Trade Court cases have held that pat-
ent infringement is an unfair method of competition.1 21 "Advertising
idea" has been described as encompassing a "valuable but uncopyright-
able idea which plaintiff has uncovered by great effort and expense.
122
One court expressly described the coverage provided by this offense as
116. No. 99 C 7466, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2204 (N.D. Ill. March 1, 2001).
117. Id. at *27.
118. See Everett, 57 F. Supp. 2d. at 884.
([U]nder the Clark Court's express ruling, Everett could have been held lia-
ble at trial for damages for patent infringement solely by virtue of its having
advertised infringing products. In light of this, it is difficult to say how Trans-
continental could prove the absence of any potential for advertising injury
coverage.).
119. Flodine, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2204, at *35.
120. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 247 (1933) ("[Tlhe claims of infringement and of
unfair competition averred in the present bill of complaint are not separate causes of ac-
tion, but different grounds asserted in support of the same cause of action.").
121. Motorola, Inc. v. Varo, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 716, 717 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Yttro Corp. v.
X-Ray Mktg. Ass'n, Inc., 559 A.2d 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Dolori Fabrics, Inc.
v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
122. Merchants Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 794 F. Supp. 611, 618 (S.D. Miss. 1992)
(citing Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple Sewing Aids, 497 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
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encompassing "misappropriation of intellectual property. '12 3 In Flodine,
the court found the "misappropriation" offense to encompass statutory
allegations that emulated "palming off" claims.' 2 4 Analogously, allega-
tions that assert liability for advertising dependent on an "offer for sale,"
a protected inventive concept, fairly nest within the one reasonable con-
struction of the "misappropriation" offense and therefore triggers a
defense.
X. CONCLUSION
The core problem is not only with courts who have interpreted cover-
age, but with counsel who have carelessly addressed issues respecting
how a policy should be interpreted. Policyholder counsel who have failed
to focus on the elements of the torts at issue and the relationship that
they bear to establishing liability based on advertisement bear no small
measure of responsibility for erroneous court rulings in this respect.
Equally at fault are insurer coverage counsel who have no familiarity with
the intellectual property torts they are requested to analyze and who mis-
construe what the appropriate elements should be. It is incumbent upon
all parties charged with the responsibility of evaluating coverage to take
their proper roles to engage in the appropriate analytic exercise and offer
meaningful and sustainable interpretations of coverage that will promote
predictability in this key coverage area.
123. Dugger v. Upledger Inst., 795 F. Supp. 184, 188 (E.D. La. 1992).
124. Flodine, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2204 at *32 and *36.
(Flodine's alleged offenses, the marketing and promotion of products as "au-
thentic Indian-made," reasonably fall within the common meaning of "style
of doing business" or "advertising idea." Capitalizing upon the goodwill as-
sociated with Indian-made products is a marketing idea concerned with how
to persuade consumers to buy certain goods.... [These] alleged activities...
also harmed competitors by using a marketing concept that others had an
exclusive right to use. This kind of harm is reasonably included in "misap-
propriation of the style of doing business.").
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